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Epilogue to “Islam in China/China in Islam” 
 
Jonathan Lipman, Mount Holyoke College 
 
In my opening comments during the conference “The Everyday Life of Islam: Focus on Islam in 
China,” held at Cornell University on April 27 and 28, 2012, I proposed a number of themes, 
tensions, and conflicts on which we might focus our discussion of the papers. This epilogue will 
summarize some of the conversations that ensued and note areas of particular interest that 
emerged from revisions to the five essays presented in this special issue of Cross-Currents: East 
Asian History and Culture Review. 
Some conference participants attempted to make generalizations at national and 
transnational levels, while others stuck tenaciously to local details. Our discussions sometimes 
strayed from “everyday life,” but rarely from diverse, sometimes divisive, solutions to the 
everyday problem of “being Muslim and being Chinese” and its macrocosmic projection, “Islam 
in China/China in Islam,” or, in Rian Thum’s contribution, Islam not in China. The essays here, 
influenced by conversations and debates during the conference, suggest future agendas for study 
of Islam in China and research on Muslim minorities and comparative religion and politics. 
 
Categories and Paradigms 
 Intellectual contexts deeply influence academic arguments, which depend upon, and arise 
directly from, the categories scholars use to order information and the questions they ask of their 
materials. Readers should particularly note the conjunctions and contrasts between the paper by a 
scholar from China (Wang) and those by U.S.-based scholars (Caffrey, Erie, Thum, and 
Turnbull). Pairs of “translated” terms such as minzu/ethnic group and zongjiao/religion do not 
embody simple one-on-one mappings. Rather, they exemplify differences between complex 
discourses influenced by languages, national histories, state interventions, academic cultures, and 
more. 
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In this collection, the essayists and many of their informants pursue understandings of 
Islamic or Hui or Uyghur authenticity, the right way to believe or understand or pray or eat as 
one of “us”—as a Muslim in China—but they clearly disagree about what that right way might 
be, or even in what discursive realm the right way might be found. Erie’s abstraction of local 
arguments about shari‘a makes a valuable analysis of this point—who has the authority to 
determine what “Islamic law” (or Islam itself) might be in a China dominated by the Communist 
Party? One could ask the same question about the Qing government, or that of the Republic of 
China. Though those earlier regimes intruded into everyday life less urgently,1 Muslims 
sometimes called on them to adjudicate Islamic rectitude, orthodoxy, or authenticity.2 
Most obviously, some contributors focus on Islam as doctrine (orthodoxy), others on 
Islamic practice (orthopraxy), and still others on the Islamic behavior of people defined as 
Muslims (that is, how to act like a Hui, Uyghur, etc.). In the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
these distinctions engage the separation between zongjiao and minzu, a conceptual differentiation 
so crucial to the state that two separate government bureaucracies have been created to deal with 
its two sides. Reifying a discursive practice over a century old, the PRC has organized the 
society it governs into discrete, unquestionable groupings called minzu, formerly anglicized as 
“minority nationalities” but now officially translated as “ethnic groups.”3 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Minzu Commission of the PRC government identified 
precisely fifty-six “minority minzu” within its borders, theoretically based on criteria developed 
by Stalin in the 1920s and on the “avowedly scientific scale of material stages of social process 
(derived from Morgan and Engels, refined by Lenin and Stalin)” (Harrell 1995, 9). No one in the 
PRC can question the facticity of these minzu entities, despite the political, subjective, local, 
sometimes cursory process of their identification or, more accurately, “differentiation” (Ch. 
shibie)—a process that included both observation and creation. No one, inside or outside the 
PRC, can doubt the draconian power of the institutions that have perpetuated and strengthened 
the state-recognized minzu since then while denying the existence of any others.4 
While religious affiliation and practice remain more or less voluntary in the PRC, 
membership in a minzu is held to be genetic, biological, and therefore (in theory) necessary and 
determined.5 Every citizen has a minzu designation on the officially issued identity card 
necessary for access to many government services or even to physical mobility. Ten of the 
officially designated minzu are called “Muslim,” meaning that their members’ ancestors were 
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Muslims, but the classification says nothing about their current relationship to their ancestral 
religion. The state has thus created two official possibilities for “being Muslim,” one involving 
zongjiao and the other minzu. 
Lesley Turnbull’s essay crystallizes the potential conflict between the two definitions. 
Her study finds that Hui from Shadian insist that only Islamic orthodoxy and orthopraxy can 
define a Muslim—a member of the transnational congregation of Islam (Ar. umma)6—thus 
rendering minzu identification irrelevant. In sharp contrast, her Kunming Hui informants argue 
that their minzu heritage makes them better Hui, and that their descent from the Prophet renders 
religious practice unnecessary.7 This mutual put-down has not yet generated any direct 
confrontation in Yunnan, but it clearly engages two very different notions of Muslim reality.8 
Local contexts and personal preferences all over China allow Sino-Muslims to occupy numerous 
positions between the poles of the zongjiao-minzu spectrum, rather than making a simple either-
or choice.9 
Matthew Erie’s essay presents this terminological dilemma with regard to shari‘a, 
Islamic religious law, and its co-optation and redefinition as “customary law” by the PRC. What 
is Islamic law supposed to be? Who should define it and enforce it? What relevance does it have 
in a modernizing, reforming China? The state-created China Islamic Association—mistrusted by 
many Muslims as too conciliatory to antireligious, atheistic party policies—has occupied the 
supposed middle ground between Muslim communities and the central government and 
attempted to answer these questions, but its answers almost always privilege the state. 
Tension has been constant, and sometimes violent, between the strictly delimited party-
state definition and the much more capacious and broadly mandated notions of shari‘a prevalent 
elsewhere in the Muslim world. The Ramadan fast, for example, one of the most crucial religious 
obligations of Muslims, has sometimes been allowed by the party-state, sometimes forbidden, 
and usually ridiculed in state discourse as “unscientific” and dangerous to Muslims’ health. 
Erie’s narrative demonstrates that even private religious duties have become part of a state-
dominated discourse that defines Islam as entirely compatible with the party-state’s demands for 
harmony and unity (which some parse as “homogeneity”), rationalism, and social stability. 
Rian Thum’s detailed study of Turki documents presents a much less common 
perspective—that of culturally non-Chinese Muslims, living in what is now part of China, for 
whom “China” remained only a distant, hazy other. Examining the vocabulary of reference to 
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their eastern neighbor, Thum’s Altishahri informants call into question the most basic terms of 
our conference, “Islam” and “China,” demonstrating the greater salience of the former, 
encompassing not only Altishahr but the entire Turko-Persian world to its west, even under 
indirect Qing rule. How does the state or religion appear to people for whom China might be a 
distant oasis city rather than an empire or culture area, and its ruler a khan rather than a huangdi? 
This unfamiliar perspective can undermine our habitual reference to “China” as something 
assumed, solid, and obviously central. 10 
 
Reformism and Fundamentalism 
 One of the most obvious tensions in the work of our conference lay in the confrontation 
between conventional Muslim institutions and practices and reformist trends, often seen as 
emanating from Saudi Arabia or Southeast Asia. The Sufi menhuan based in northwest China, 
inter-minzu religious syncretism and Sufism in Yunnan (Caffrey, Wang), even the basic 
structures of Sino-Islamic knowledge—all have come under attack as “innovations” (Ar. bid’a) 
or “local accretions” by reformists associated with movements such as the Ikhwan and 
Salafiyya.11 An Arabicization trend, taking the transnational, transcultural umma as its 
foundation and Arab culture as its mode, has been described in many parts of China, including in 
Turnbull’s study of Shadian. Wang Jianping’s paper addresses an early example of precisely this 
conflict—Ma Dexin, a widely respected nineteenth-century cleric, producing a systematic (and 
“modern”) critique of Shi’ism and Sufism. 
Kevin Caffrey’s essay adds another diachronic dimension to the tension between 
reformism and “the way things have always been,” intensely focused on a Yunnanese multi-
minzu village. In his account, the disappearance of the Naxi altar from behind the Dragon Village 
mosque—an event—illuminates larger processes of change within Hui communities and of 
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims in diverse Chinese contexts. In Dragon Village, 
unlike in Turnbull’s Kunming, a modern reformist version of orthopraxy—fundamentalist, 
Wahhabi, anti-accretion, anti-Sufi—overtook (temporarily, at least) the previous practices of 
inter-minzu sociality, except for one stubborn non-Muslim herdsman who refused to give up his 
white skullcap. Taking a more conciliatory position, of which state authority would likely 
approve, the local Muslim educator Ma Xiaoxiong advocated that, “Hui should be students of 
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Islam and recognizably Chinese in their Hui tradition” (Caffrey, this issue, p. 28). Even within 
one small and remote place, different definitions of authenticity were articulated and acted out. 
Like their informants, the participants in the conference held widely differing notions of 
the flexibility or rigidity of Islam as a religious-cultural system, demanding different analyses of 
Muslim (or Hui or Uyghur) legitimacy. Here, too, a worldwide spectrum of possibilities exists 
for both scholars and Muslims on the ground, and many questions arose. For example: 
Is Islam a limited body of texts and ideas susceptible to correct and incorrect 
interpretations, or is Islam “what Muslims believe and do”? How do particular groups of 
Muslims reconcile the tensions between their chosen right way and the many (to them) wrong 
ways to be a Muslim? 
Is there a point in localization at which what Muslims believe and do ceases to be 
“Islam?” We can all recognize the differences between Lesley Turnbull’s Mrs. Yang and Mrs. 
Na, but is one of them more Muslim or more Hui than the other? If so, by what standard of 
orthodoxy or orthopraxy do we make the judgment, which might well disagree with the self-
conceptions of some of her informants? 
Can local culture(s) legitimately play a role in determining how Muslims practice Islam? 
Or must we recognize a pure Islam, to which all actual Islamic practice must be compared, 
reifying a transcultural standard for Muslim authenticity? Who has the authority to define that 
pure Islam? 
What can we say about a more extreme example of Muslim diversity—a member of the 
Hui minzu and thus, by genealogical definition, a Muslim, who has joined the Chinese 
Communist Party and thus publicly accepted atheism, never goes to a mosque or prays, and eats 
pork and drinks alcohol with his non-Hui colleagues in order to fit in?12 
Finally, can the study of Islamic communities and their texts even call into question the 
nature of the “China” they supposedly inhabit? 
Both our collection of scholars in Ithaca, New York, and our diverse informants must 
deal with these and many more definitional questions. 
 
Modernity and Religion 
 The place of Muslims (however defined) in modern China, and of Chinese Muslims in 
the modern world, received considerable attention from the conference participants. Modernity 
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dilemmas, some of them common to all religions and believers, have been particularly acute in 
China, where modernity arrived—at least in the conventional story—borne by aggressive, 
amoral, greedy imperialists. The “China” they invaded, the Qing Empire, was deeply mired in 
“feudal” and corrupt politics, which are generally blamed on the Empress Dowager and the Qing 
elite she led. Like all subjects of that empire, Muslims had to adapt to the traumatic presence of 
the overwhelmingly powerful foreigners, bearing their alien weapons, goods, sociopolitical 
structures, and beliefs. In response, Chinese nationalists, including many Muslims, advocated a 
strong, centralized, militarily and economically powerful state to defend China, defined as the 
entire territory of the former Qing Empire, including all of Xinjiang and Tibet, against foreign 
aggression. Thum’s nineteenth- and early twentieth-century manuscripts, of course, saw the Qing 
and the Chinese Republic as the outside aggressors, flying directly in the face of Chinese 
nationalism and branding it as foreign. Given this conflicted history and its diverse impacts on 
different communities and regions, Muslims in China can no more agree on what “modern” 
ought to mean than they can on a homogeneous vision of Islam. 
 
The Heterogeneity of Authenticity 
 Given their rich ethnographic and historical detail, it would be impossible to summarize 
these papers in a few terse themes. All the essays, however, reflect the wide variety of “ways of 
being Muslim (or Hui or Uyghur or Turki)” in the People’s Republic of China and its ancestor 
states. That multiplicity itself presents an epilogue writer with an obvious conclusion—namely 
that our informants themselves, whether individuals or texts, cannot define a single, invariable, 
authoritative “way of Islam in China.” Their specific communities, stubbornly local and 
heterogeneous, have evolved under influences as diverse as Central Asian Sufism, Saudi Arabian 
reformism, Persian storytelling, Middle Eastern Islamic modernism, transnational tourism, and 
Chinese communism. 
As always when we study China’s vast, highly differentiated spaces and convoluted 
modern histories, we must attend carefully to context, both geographical and chronological. 
Muslims in Shadian and Kunming, only four hours apart by road, presented Lesley Turnbull with 
radically different notions of “being Muslim.” How much more diverse might the picture become 
if we include Caffrey’s Dragon Village (in the same province), Thum’s distant Qing-period 
Khotan, or the tens of thousands of other Muslim possibilities within the PRC? Erie did his 
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fieldwork in Linxia, so we must ask what local and regional historical evolutions have shaped the 
arguments over the content, scope, and even fundamental legitimacy of shari‘a? To interrogate 
Wang’s essay, we may wonder what criteria of orthodoxy and orthopraxy lay behind Ma Dexin’s 
rejection of Sufism in the particular conditions of Yunnan in the 1870s? 
That is, we cannot define being Muslim, being Hui, or being Uyghur (or Turki) in 
univocal, static, stereotypical, or doctrinaire terms without violating the realities of historical or 
contemporary China. This should not surprise anyone familiar with religious history anywhere—
including that of Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, or Islam—or with ethnography and 
ethnohistory. Large-scale definitions, attractive or useful though they may be, invariably break 
down in the face of detailed, local, careful understanding. We owe many thanks to the organizers 
and participants in the Cornell conference for advancing the specificity, complexity, and 
diversity of our knowledge of everyday life and everyday Islam among Muslims in China. 
 
Jonathan Lipman is the Felicia Gressitt Bock Professor of Asian Studies and professor of history 
at Mount Holyoke College. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Notes 
 
1 As the conventional Chinese proverb had it, “The sky is high, and the emperor is far 
away.” 
2 For the Qing, see Lipman (2006). For the Republican period, see Mao (forthcoming). 
3 I shall leave the term minzu untranslated, to emphasize its difference from any English 
equivalent. In the twentieth century, it clearly derives from the Japanese minzoku (K. 
minjok), a kanji term chosen in the 1870s as a translation for European words such as Fr. 
la nation, Ger. das Volk, and Eng. nation, a concept without an obvious East Asian 
equivalent until then.  
4 For a meticulously documented history of the “nationality differentiation project” (C. 
minzu shibie), see Mullaney (2010). 
5 Children of “mixed marriages”—with parents in two different minzu—have either been 
registered automatically in the minzu of their fathers or allowed to choose between the 
two when they reach adulthood. Some hundreds of thousands of PRC citizens do not 
belong to a recognized minzu; in the relevant census data, they are listed as “other” (C. 
qita). 
6 As she writes, “By consuming international Islamic literature and media, Shadian 
Muslims imagine a religious past, present, and future that temporally and spatially 
incorporates the umma as an entirety and marks them as members of that umma” 
(Turnbull, this issue, p. 52). 
7 In Turnbull’s words, “authentic identity for Kunming Hui precluded religious practice: 
because a solid ethnic pedigree could absolve a person of the religious obligation to 
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practice Islam, a known Hui Muslim who did not pray five times a day could be, among 
certain elite urban Hui, viewed as more ethnically authentic than one who had to prove 
his Huiness” (Turnbull, this issue, p. 47). 
8 I have been struck many times during my years of research on Islam and Muslims in 
China by the resemblance of this twentieth-century Chinese contrast—Islam as zongjiao 
identity versus Huiness as minzu identity—to parallel conflicting definitions in the Euro-
American Jewish world in which I grew up. For some, “being Jewish” refers primarily to 
orthopraxy, for others only to ethnic (often “cultural”) heritage. Many Orthodox Jews, 
like the Shadian Muslims, exclude nonobservant Jews from Jewishness, while many 
“cultural” (or “ethnic”) Jews, like the Kunming Hui, claim an identity more “authentic” 
than that of their orthopractic critics. 
9 Gladney (1991) provides numerous examples of intermediate positioning, as does Gillette 
(2000). Some modernist, atheist Hui of my acquaintance, for example, have become more 
observant and orthodox as they age, going to the mosque more often after retirement or 
reading religious texts “to prepare for the end.” Similarly, Dautcher (2009) observed 
Uyghur informants undergoing substantial changes in their religious observance and 
piety, almost conversion experiences, after returning from the hajj or entering a new 
phase of life. 
10 In my work on the Sufi orders of Gansu, I have found even culturally Chinese Muslims 
reversing conventional Sinocentric categories. They called their spiritual ancestors 
outside China the “inner generations,” while their own leaders in northwestern China 
constituted the “outer generations.” This nomenclature, like Thum’s Turki vocabulary, 
does not appear in current Chinese scholarship. 
11 Common throughout the Muslim umma, these accusations are often characterized as 
“Wahhabi” or “fundamentalist” and considered to be an unavoidable part of Islam’s 
adaptation (like that of many religions) to the modern world. 
12 During my fieldwork in northwest China, I heard a Chinese proverb about Hui 
flexibility—“One Hui is no Hui, only two Hui are Hui”—meaning that a Hui alone will 
drink alcohol or eat pork, but will not if another Hui is present to observe his 
transgression. 
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